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## The New Army.

It has long been clear that the situation into which the nation has got itself in the Philippine business would result finally in the enlargement of the standing army. But for this situation, the proposition permanently to increase the army would have found few supporters except the professional military men. The expected has happened. Opposition of senators and representatives, and such as there has been throughout the country, has proved of no avail. The Philippine tide — or in the broader sense the imperialistic tide — has swept away all obstacles, and henceforth an army of one hundred thousand men is fastened upon us, the war department having decided, immediately on the bill becoming law, to recruit the army to its full authorized strength.

Aside from the demand raised by the seizure and attempted conquest of the Philippines, not a solitary reason can be found for the addition of a single soldier to the military force of the nation as it has stood ever since the Civil War. Indeed, it could easily have been decreased. There is little need of troops any longer in the "care" of the Indians. The Christian peace policy which has been adopted and in considerable measure put into practice in the treatment of these wards has made soldiers a superfluity. Again, there is not the remotest danger of an invasion of our country from sea or land. An attempted invasion from over the seas would be the height of folly on the part of any power, and little less idiotic would be such an attempt from Canada or Mexico.

If the coast fortifications, into which so many millions have been sunk, were brought to the state of efficiency which has been demanded for them, not over ten thousand men would be required to man them. As a nucleus for an infantry force, which is all our regular army is claimed to be, fifteen or twenty thousand men, kept in a high state of efficiency, would be just as good as fifty thousand.

The plea so often put forth that we should have one soldier for every thousand of the population is based on pure fancy. Not a shadow of reason can be found for it. The growth of population in a civilized country is no ground whatever for an increased military force. Military forces ought steadily to decrease in such countries. The very conception of civilization implies the progressive abandonment of reliance on brute force. We got on with an army of twenty-five thousand men as well when we were sixty-five millions as when we were forty-five. This was our boast, and if any boasting were ever creditable this was.

Again, an army is of no value for the protection of commerce on the seas. We needed no increase for that purpose, even though our foreign trade has grown to two thousand millions a year. To want a big army because we were getting to be a big people

with a big foreign trade was the silliest school-boy ambition, of which all Americans ought to be ashamed.

We needed no increased army to enable us to fulfil our mission — the mission marked out by the character of our institutions — in other quarters of the globe. We had been fulfilling that mission, with increasing light and inspiration to other peoples, for over a hundred years. We were growing more respected and safer and securer every year.

The new army of a hundred thousand men is, then, primarily, the sign and seal of the wrong and injustice which we have been doing and propose still to do to the Philippine people; and the badge of the nation's temporary disownment of its own political ideals, constitutional principles and high historic professions. It is to be used for no other immediate purpose than the completion of this unjust and dishonorable Philippine scheme. The new soldiers will be sent abroad to kill and be killed, to die of tropical diseases, or to fall into moral ruin in camp and barracks.

While the foregoing is the chief cause of the enlargement of the army, the patronage and professional elements in it are not to be overlooked. Intelligent observers in Washington, who have been in close touch with the movement for the increase, declare that patronage is accountable for three-fourths of what has been done. This is doubtless an overstatement. But it is known to everybody that knocking at the doors of Congress and the White House have been thousands of persons, many of them "friends" of Congressmen, begging for commissions in the army, and using their utmost influence, personally or by letter, to promote the passage of the reorganization bill.

Nor is it unfair to charge the military professionals with much of the responsibility. Years ago, long before the war with Spain, they were perpetually clamoring for a greater military establishment. They saw everything through European spectacles. Some of them, whose names are not far to seek, were foremost among those who urged war against Spain when the President would have avoided it. They were pathetically interested in the liberation of Cuba. They have, almost without exception, demanded, frequently in the most brutal language, the subjugation of the Philippines. No sooner is the Army Bill law than the first act under it is the promotion of a big batch of these men. The lesson? He that runneth may read it. No other class of men in the nation, from the nature of their position, has such a lever constantly under the government. Herein lies one of the gravest dangers of our immediate future — the increasing dictation of the military class.

The case, unfortunate as it is, would not be so bad if the present increase in the army were to be the end of the matter, even though it is to throw an

increased burden of nearly a hundred millions a year upon the taxpayers. A hundred thousand soldiers is not comparatively and in the abstract a large number for a nation of seventy-six millions of people. This fact has been used with great skill in getting the new enactment made. But it will not be long until it will be urged that a hundred thousand men make a very insignificant army in comparison with the huge establishments of the Old World. The navy promoters were recently alarming themselves over the inadequacy of the navy to fight the war fleet of Germany, with whom they feel almost cocksure that we shall before long have to battle on the sea. The army managers will be up to the same folly as soon as the hundred thousand men now given them get well on their feet.

The possession of this new army power makes it more difficult than ever for the nation to draw back from the imperialistic course on which it has so recklessly started. Use must be found for it, and will without fail be found for it. Bad as the quadrupling of the regular army is in itself, with the squandering of nearly a hundred millions additional per year on it, it is much worse as a long step in the fixing of a disastrous and utterly unworthy militarism upon the country.

But it is useless to cry over spilt milk, we shall be told. The thing is done, and there is no help for it. If that be true, then so much the worse for the nation. But the figure of spilt milk is wrong. Another fits the case much better. If a deadly serpent had gotten into a man's house, he would not reason that there is no help for it. Especially would he bestir himself if there were another not far from the door ready to thrust his slimy length in. Not only ought the members of the deadly serpent brood of militarism which are still outside our national house to be kept out, but the ugly one already within ought to be slain and cast out. By-and-by the people will cast him out, but not, as it now seems, until he has bitten many of the children to death and greatly desolated the whole interior. At the present time his gleaming, beady eyes are beautiful and fascinating, and the children gather in their simplicity and look at him with breathless admiration, unwitting of the sad fate which awaits them when his fangs have been driven deep into their flesh.

### Civilized Barbarism and Savagery.

In the early days of the war in South Africa, General Buller, then commander-in-chief, addressed a memorandum to General Joubert saying that the British would do no damage to Boer farmhouses, and asking that English property, the mines, etc., be in like manner respected. At the Hague Conference in 1899 Great Britain's representative solemnly signed a convention on the laws of war in which were found

these provisions: "It is forbidden to attack or bombard undefended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings. Any pressure on the population of occupied territory to take the oath to the hostile power is prohibited. Private property cannot be confiscated. Looting is formally forbidden. No collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, can be levied on populations by reason of individual incidents for which they could not be considered collectively responsible."

In the face of these solemn declarations and promises, what has happened? All the world now knows that not the least regard has been paid to them by the British forces. Lord Roberts seems never to have seen them, or if he had seen them, he deliberately ignored them.

Mr. John M. Robertson, well known in this country, has written to the *Westminster Review* the result of his personal observations in South Africa. He says that in the early days of the occupation of the Free State, the work of burning farms was systematically done. The order formula was: "Owner absent on Commando; burn his farm." About five hundred farms were burned in the southern part of the Free State alone. About ninety per cent. of these, he was told, were burned while their owners were prisoners of war. He saw an order of Lord Roberts directing that forty specified farms should be burned. He personally investigated a case in which a group of eight farms were burned at one operation, was told by a correspondent of a case where he was present at the burning of a group of sixteen, and heard of numerous cases where groups of four and five were destroyed at one operation. Farms, he learned, were burned wherever the generals thought it necessary to destroy the enemy's means of subsistence in a given district. A Colonial officer, who was with Buller on the march from Paardekop to Ermelo, told him that they burned every house on the march. Mr. Robertson's conclusion was that at least one-third and probably one-half of all the farms in the two republics had been burned, and that the claim that only those were burned from which the British troops had been fired on under a flag of truce was entirely false. De Wet and Steyn, in the proclamation recently issued, declare that *nearly all* the houses have been destroyed whether near railways or not.

In comparison with this conduct of the high-professing British in destroying farms and turning women and children out sobbing and helpless on the veldts, that of the Boers, even if the worst said of them be true, has been angelic. They nearly uniformly protected the property of the English until after the British troops had done these things, and how comparatively little they have retaliated even since! It is no wonder that the Boer men who remain, whose habitations have perished, are in the field against the British determined to drive out the merciless invaders or perish to the last man.